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Abstract  
  
This paper explores pathways to power from the perspective of the French corporate elite. It 
compares those who enter the ‘field of power’ with those who fail to reach this final tier. 
Adopting an innovative econometric approach, we develop and test three hypotheses. These 
underline the pivotal role of external networks and the strategic advantage of hyper-agency in 
maintaining power; and indicate that social origin remains a powerful driver in determining 
success. Birthright and meritocracy emerge as two competing institutional logics which 
influence life chances. Higher-status agents benefit from mutual recognition which enhances 
their likelihood of co-option to the extra-corporate networks that facilitate hyper-agency. The 
objectification of class-based differences conceals their arbitrary nature while 
institutionalizing the principles informing stratification. We re-connect class analysis with 
organizational theory; arguing that social origin exerts an enduring influence on selection 
dynamics which inform processes of hierarchical reproduction in the corporate elite and 
society-at-large.  
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Introduction  
Zald and Lounsbury (2010, p. 983) recently called for a re-engagement with key issues 
concerning elites and their ‘strategic command posts’ (Mills, 1956, p. 4), focusing on the 
structures they exploit to extend their influence and agency. Their call echoes the exhortation 
by Courpasson, Arellano-Gault, Brown and Lounsbury (2008) for organization theorists to 
address issues relating to the dynamics of status and stratification in society. This paper 
contributes to research on this important topic. It focuses on the French corporate elite and 
the pathways pursued by the most powerful amongst them – hyper-agents, the elite within the 
elite – into what Bourdieu (1993; 1996) terms the ‘field of power’ (FoP). This is the 
integrative social domain that transcends individual fields and organizations, serving as a 
metafield of contestation for dominant agents – individuals holding a controlling position 
within an organizational field – from different walks of life. We follow Bottomore (1966, p.  
14) in defining elites as ‘functional, mainly occupational, groups that have high status … in a society’. 
This leads us, for the purposes of this study, to identify members of the French corporate elite as the board 
members of the top 100 French companies.   
Extant research, with notable exceptions (Cappelli & Hamori, 2005; Clegg,  
Courpasson & Philips, 2006; Courpasson, 2000; Courpasson & Clegg, 2006; Hartmann, 
2000; 2002; Reed, 2012; Zald & Lounsbury, 2010), tells us relatively little about the making 
and activities of hyper-agents whose power and networks extend beyond corporate 
boundaries into society-at-large (Savage & Williams, 2008). Studies connecting the 
lifeworlds of business elites to other worlds in the FoP are rare (Mills, 1956; Useem, 1984). 
This is regrettable, given the growing importance of elites in contemporary society, as ‘state 
power’ recedes in favour of those who run global corporations (Beck, 2008). Given the 
disproportionate exercise of power by a small number of players, there is a need to 
investigate further the ‘contemporary dynamics of elite production’ (Clegg et al., 2006, p. 
  3  
357). This entails a re-examination of the social struggles which inform stratification 
(Dudouet & Grémont, 2007). The role of social origin in determining which individuals come 
to occupy command posts in business and society is neglected in organization theory 
(Dezalay, 1995; Scott, 2002). The language of class has lost much of its currency, displaced 
by rhetoric based on age, gender and ethnicity (Bennett et al., 2009; Bottero, 2004; Skeggs,  
2004). Yet the battle to ‘unmask domination’ (Golsorkhi, Leca, Lounsbury & Ramirez, 2009) 
demands examining afresh the role of social class in the acquisition and maintenance of 
power at the highest level (Denord, Lagneau-Ymonet & Thine, 2011; François, 2010).  
It is this research gap that the present paper addresses. In what follows, we develop 
and test three hypotheses relating to the logic and operation of the FoP, applying advanced 
statistical modelling techniques to extensive data on French corporate elites. Our objective is 
to better understand the role of external networks, hyper-agency and social class in 
determining who becomes an actor in the FoP. The static and dynamic models we develop 
help explain how a minority of business leaders establish and maintain positions of authority 
within the FoP (Dezalay, 1995). Others have recognized the importance of dependencies in 
social networks, such as how appointment as CEO will likely open other doors (Yeo, Pochet 
& Alcouffe, 2003); but here we move beyond the limitations of standard single-equation 
models that fail to capture the complex interrelationships that shape career paths (Useem & 
Karabel, 1986). Rather, we incorporate the inherent endogeneity of career pathways through 
application of a generalised linear model, differentiating between variables of fate, given at 
birth and outside agents’ control, and variables of choice, where actions and attitudes matter. 
This approach enables us to identify more precisely direct and indirect relationships between 
critical variables, and to test more robustly the three hypotheses we advance.  
In the following section, we review the literature on French elites and establish the 
context of our research. We then elaborate Bourdieu’s concept of the FoP in terms of purpose, 
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modus operandi and domination by hyper-agents, explaining how this fits within his 
framework of capital and field theory. The three hypotheses around which the paper is framed 
are then articulated and explained. Details of our sources and methods follow before testing 
of hypotheses and presentation of our findings. The enduring importance of social class as a 
master variable is highlighted, establishing the focus for theorization in our discussion and 
conclusion.  
  
The French Corporate Elite  
It is some time since Lévy-Leboyer (1979, p. 181, cited in François, 2010, p. 11) predicted 
the ‘equalization of conditions of access to the business elite’.1 Yet neither mass education 
nor three decades of globalization have undermined the French corporate elite’s grip on 
power. Power-brokers require ‘a solid baggage of expertise’ (Dezalay, 1995, p. 342), but the 
meritocratic ethos of the French Republic is at odds with the ‘elitist conceptualization of 
power’ which prevails (Genieys, 2005, p. 414); resulting in on-going tensions between 
‘nostalgia for the ruling class… unified by a bloc of traditions and internal alliances, and the 
promise of a permanent democratic openness, the justification of any Republican 
meritocracy’ (Charle, 1987, p. 455). Bourdieu (1996) contends that education reinforces 
existing social structures by strengthening disparities in culture, status and wealth. The 
outward appearance of equal opportunity, however, is sustained by the notion of a  
‘meritocratic society which rewards effort and … selects the best’ (Pinçon & Pinçon-Charlot, 
2007, p. 103). Elite training has become the preserve of the grandes écoles, which foster ‘the 
belief of the dominant class in their own legitimacy and … the belief of the other classes in 
that legitimacy’ (Wacquant, 1993, p. 39). The Ecole Polytechnique was founded in 1794 by 
revolutionaries who failed to anticipate the ‘entrenchment’ of French elites along class lines  
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(Suleiman, 1978). The Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), France’s most prestigious 
grande école, was established in 1945 following the discrediting of the old elite, yet serves as 
a ‘machine for classifying people’ (Suleiman, 1997, p. 21). Tradition, combined with the 
rigidity of the examination structure, has militated against its professed democratization 
(Bourdieu & Saint-Martin, 1973); its student body remaining predominantly upper-middle 
class (Suleiman, 1997).   
Viewed in this light, birth and meritocracy appear as two competing society-level or 
institutional logics; the espoused Republican logic of egalitarianism and meritocracy at 
variance with the underlying but dominant logic of elitism and heredity (Argyris, 1977; 
Charle, 1987). According to Thornton and Ocasio (1999), power in organizations is 
influenced by higher-order logics which prevail in society-at-large (Davis & Greve, 1997). 
Institutional logics ‘define the norms, values, and beliefs that structure the cognition of actors 
in organizations and provide a collective understanding of how strategic interests… are 
formulated’ (Thornton, 2002, p. 82). The two competing logics of birthright and meritocracy 
are reflected in our study by variables of fate and variables of choice respectively.  
The French corporate elite are presented in the literature as relatively unified, 
characterized by dense, cohesive networks (Wagner, 2010). This derives partly from the  
‘strong and homogenous bureaucratic training’ imparted by the grandes écoles (Genieys, 
2005, p. 419; Suleiman, 1978), inculcating similar ‘ways of seeing, feeling, thinking and 
acting’ (Eymeri, 2001, p. 824). This shared habitus may be reinforced further by membership 
of a grand corps (Boltanski, 1973; Hartmann, 2000), the pinnacle of France’s civil service 
elite, functioning as extended families (Dudouet & Joly, 2010; Suleiman, 1978). The business 
elite comprise a small world characterized by high levels of social closure (Boltanski, 1973; 
Davis, Yoo & Baker, 2003). Denord et al. (2011, p. 37) highlight the ‘very strong social 
endogamy’ of French directors: a social group ‘particularly closed in on itself’ (Comet & 
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Finez, 2010, pp. 9-10). Those achieving membership of the exclusive Club du Siècle, the 
epitome of privilege, are reputedly characterized by a ‘unity of type, uniformity of age, 
monotony of scholarly diplomas, homogeneity of origins and conformity of class’ (Denord et 
al., 2011, p. 56; Kadushin, 1995). This small world effect has been heightened traditionally 
by the prevalence of interlocking directorships, ties which bind the business system together; 
although recent governance initiatives have led to their partial dilution (Maclean, 2002). 
Family networks are pivotal in France (Bauer & Bertin-Mourot, 1997); and the business 
world has woven strong ties with the State, which serves as a lynchpin (Hartmann, 2011).   
Prior research has shown how power is unevenly distributed between central and more 
marginalized dominant agents in France (Comet & Finez, 2010). One of our objectives in this 
paper is to explain why this is so.  
  
The Field of Power  
The work of Bourdieu has aroused considerable interest in organization science (Anheier,  
Gerhards & Romo, 1995; Golsorkhi et al., 2009; Kerr & Robinson, 2012; Oakes, Townley &  
Cooper, 1998). His ‘master concepts’ of capital (economic, cultural, social and symbolic 
resources), field (social spaces of objective relations between positions) and habitus 
(internalized dispositions) have attracted much attention. He is less well known, conversely, 
for his analysis of class structure in general, and of hierarchy and domination in particular.  
His concept of the FoP remains under-utilized, despite its theoretical and empirical potential 
(Bourdieu, 1993; 1996). The present paper presents an opportunity to explore this latter 
aspect of his work.  
For Bourdieu, power is relationally embedded. He conceives of the FoP as ‘a field of 
forces structurally determined by the state of relations of power among different forms of 
power, or different forms of capital’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 264). Capital is a social relation, a 
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generalized resource denoting a ‘power over the field’ (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 724). Domination 
within any field is contingent on possessing the right quantities and combinations of 
economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital. Economic capital is the overriding 
differentiator, since conventional wealth may ultimately be converted into other forms of 
capital. Cultural capital, denoting familiarity of the arts and culture as well as scientific 
knowledge, is gained through formal education and informal assimilation, objectified as 
qualifications, and more readily available to offspring of the well-to-do classes. The progeny 
of the better-off similarly have access through family and friends to social capital, a dense 
network of relationships and reciprocal obligations pivotal to career advancement and social 
advantage (Le Wita, 1994). Symbolic capital, in the form of honours and titles, desirable 
goods, privileged pursuits and memberships, legitimizes the domination of elite agents 
through institutional consecration (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 129). Capital formation is an on-going, 
dynamic process, subject to accumulation or attrition. It fortifies social distinctions, social 
processes being driven by struggles waged implicitly between different classes and class 
fractions. While ‘all positions of arrival are not equally probable for all starting points’ 
(Bourdieu, 1986, p. 110), the expertise of individual agents in playing the hand they are dealt 
influences the outcomes of ensuing struggles in the FoP. Bourdieu illustrates this point in The 
Field of Cultural Production (1993), populating a fictitious FoP with the panoply of heirs and 
arrivistes featured in Flaubert’s novel Sentimental Education. The aces they hold are ‘the 
inherited assets which define the possibilities inherent in the field’ (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 150).  
However, the characters must still play the game skilfully to succeed (Bourdieu, 1996).   
In the hierarchy of fields and subfields which obtains, the corporate field is ascendant, 
its distinguished representatives aligning with the FoP’s most elevated positions (Bourdieu,  
1996, p. 269). This is partly due to the nature of its field-specific capital. Bourdieu (2011, p. 
128) distinguishes between the possession of capital per se and that of capital granting power 
  8  
over different forms of capital. For Bourdieu (1986), the specific logic of a field dictates 
which capitals hold sway within it. What sets the organizational field apart above all is the 
potential of its field-specific capital (predominately economic as well as cultural) for 
accumulation and convertibility into other resources, assets and forms of power, potentially 
resulting in the accrual of a sufficient quantity of capital to dominate the field (Bourdieu, 
2011; Savage, Warde & Devine, 2005). This gives the uppermost echelons of the corporate 
field a particular affinity with the ruling class, ‘the collection of agents who occupy de facto 
positions of power over capital’ (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 128). Corporate heads, by virtue of their 
privileged positioning within the organizational field, occupy as if by right a distinctive place 
in French society among the ruling elite (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 136; Savage et al., 2013). As 
Bourdieu (1996, p. 335) explains:   
‘Few ruling groups have ever brought together so many principles of legitimation of 
such diversity, which, although apparently contradictory (such as the aristocratism of 
birth and the meritocratism of academic success…), combine to inspire in the new 
leaders the most absolute certainty in their legitimacy’.   
  
That the principles of legitimation upon which their success rests derive from the competing 
logics of meritocracy and birthright enhances their power and status. The corporate elite’s 
belief in its own legitimacy stems from its capacity ‘to impose on the dominated the 
recognition of its domination, that is to say, the misrecognition of the arbitrary nature of its 
power’ (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 139). Making the arbitrary appear destined, decreed by fate, blurs 
the boundaries between logics of fate and choice, such that agents ‘feel “made” for jobs that 
are “made” for them’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 110).   
The reproduction of oligarchies is effected through the interplay of individual agency 
in conjunction with the instruments and institutions of consecration. The latter include the 
grandes écoles and grands corps, whose shared function is to reproduce a system which 
manages the elite’s internal divisions by classifying the ‘dominated and dominant fractions of 
  9  
the dominant class’ (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 101), mirroring processes within the FoP. Individual 
agency is critical. Careers, particularly those of dominant agents, extend beyond the confines 
of organizations, connecting struggles within the organization with wider societal conflicts  
(Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; O’Mahony & Bechky, 2008). So while organizational fields 
are sites of contestation, where agents are defined as dominant or subordinate according to 
their location in the field (Iellatchitch, Mayrhofer & Meyer, 2003), the FoP serves as a 
‘macro-level arena of struggle across a range of power fields’ (Swartz, 2008, p. 50). Here, the 
most dominant agents from different fields like health, politics, law, culture and the media are 
pitted against each other (Dezalay, 1995; Wacquant, 1993). These trials of strength in the FoP 
are not a smooth process, as agents occupying different positions and possessing different 
types and volumes of capital jostle for dominance. Yet the FoP also creates the structural 
conditions for agents to make common cause by forming (temporary) issue-based coalitions 
of interests, turning competition and contestation into collusion  
(O’Mahony & Bechky, 2008). Shared class-based interests promote collaboration in the FoP, reinforcing 
the contours of the corporate elite as a class within the ruling class, to which it shares particular 
homologies (Bourdieu, 2011). Power has been defined elsewhere as  
‘command over resources’ (Maclean, Harvey & Press, 2006; Maclean, Harvey & Chia, 2010). 
Here, we extend this definition to embrace as a key resource the power of elite occupants of 
command posts to assemble diverse groups of high-status actors to make common cause. 
Lindsay (2008, p. 62) calls this a form of ‘convening power’, which he identifies as one of 
the most compelling resources at the disposal of elites, through which they ‘impose strategic 
orientations’ (François, 2010, p. 7). Notably, a resource must be maintained to retain its 
capacity to be exercised. Elites must therefore preserve their legitimate right to convene 
power by retaining place and remaining active within the FoP  
(Courpasson & Golsorkhi, 2009).    
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Through alliances and networks, elite agents operating within the FoP seek to 
influence societal decision-making processes, resource flows, opinion formation and wider 
logics of action by winning commitment to agreed objectives. They battle to impose their 
values and appropriate positions of power (Bourdieu, 2011). Sustained by public perceptions 
of their civic-mindedness, they become the purveyors of legitimizing narratives designed to 
shape collective systems of meaning (Giddens, 1984; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Agents 
seek to direct agendas while influencing their own positioning within social space; the 
boundary between those who belong and those who do not, inclusion and exclusion, being 
continually contested and redrawn (Bourdieu, 1993).   
Combatants, however, do not merely challenge for a place in the FoP. In claiming the  
‘right’ to discourse, the most powerful compete to determine the nature of the FoP itself.  
What is at stake is ‘a redefinition … of a whole series of pecking orders’ (Dezalay, 1995, p. 
336). Contestants struggle to impose ‘the species of capital which gives the upper hand in the 
field of power, and … across all of society’ (Wacquant, 1993, p. 25). In doing so, some force 
action through legislative or quasi-legislative means, shaping the regulatory and fiscal 
landscape in their favour, depending on their interests (François, 2010). Hyper-agency can be 
deployed to preserve the status quo; it also creates the possibility to re-order the rules of the 
game and reset the system – to contest the right to ‘dictate the dominant principle of 
domination’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 265).  
  
Development of Hypotheses  
Our statistical models, one static, the other dynamic, test three implications of the FoP: (1) 
networks outside the corporate sphere are crucial in enhancing and sustaining power (defined 
by positions); (2) hyper-agents are more successful in extending their influence and retaining 
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power; (3) social class is the critical ‘control variable’ in determining which agents enter and 
maintain positions of influence within the FoP.  
  Extant literature emphasizes the value of bridge-building relationships beyond 
company boundaries in bolstering power (Coignard & Guichard, 2000; Collins-Dogrul, 2012; 
Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Scott, 1991). The external activities of directors increase 
their value to their organizations, but also work to their personal advantage (Useem, 1984). 
Burt, Hogarth and Michaud (2000, p. 141) found that successful French executives benefited 
from networks rich in ‘structural holes’, enhancing their ability to attract resources, which 
‘flow disproportionately to people who provide indirect connections between otherwise 
disconnected groups’. Collins-Dogrul (2012) concurs, arguing that brokers reap rewards by 
bringing together previously disconnected actors and helping to sustain these relationships. 
These analyses support Granovetter’s (1974, p. 52) assertion that the acquisition of power is 
influenced by the ‘strategic location of a person’s contacts’. However, these accounts do not 
tell us enough about how an agent’s positioning within a web of external networks might 
facilitate their attainment of top-tier positions (Stern & Westphal, 2010), particularly in the 
cultural context of the French corporate elite (Denord et al., 2011; François, 2010; Pinçon & 
Pinçon-Charlot, 1998). Hence, we state:  
Hypothesis 1: Networks beyond company boundaries determine an agent’s power in 
terms of achieving top executive and non-executive positions.  
Prior literature likewise suggests that hyper-agents who pursue multiple career 
pathways strengthen their overall position (Davis et al., 2003; Hamdouch, 1989; O’Mahony 
& Bechky, 2008). A study of 84 French CEOs conducted by Bauer and Bertin-Mourot (1997) 
found that the longest-serving were those in highly networked companies, suggesting a 
connection between career longevity and corporate networking. The boundary-spanning 
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activities of hyper-agents provide a bridge between corporations and not-for-profit 
organizations, serving as ‘conduits for social influence’ (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997, p. 
657). These enable them to ‘exert disproportionate influence’ over the governance of both 
companies and society-at-large (Stern & Westphal, 2010, p. 280). Schervish (2003), for 
example, observes that hyper-agents active in philanthropy enjoy an increasingly extensive 
policy-making and agenda-setting role, becoming ‘nodal actors’ (Ball, 2008, p. 749). 
Philanthropy confers legitimacy and increases voice, so amplifying their potential to 
determine outcomes in other fields (Brown, 1994). However, the literature tells us little about 
how pursuing multiple pathways might help maintain a position within the FoP through the 
cultivation of diverse channels of influence. Thus, we propose:  
Hypothesis 2: Being a hyper-agent is the best strategy to retain place within the FoP.  
Agents restricted to one pathway are less likely to retain power.  
Palmer and Barber (2001) argue that embeddedness in prized organizational and 
social networks is a manifestation of the class system (Bond, 2012; Kadushin, 1995; Mills,  
1956). The implication is that agents who suffer social status marginality find it more  
difficult to penetrate the ‘inner group’ of corporate directors active in the FoP. Westphal and 
Zajac (1995) stress the importance of demographic similarity in director selection. For Stern 
and Westphal (2010), an agent’s capacity to secure board appointments is regulated by 
ingratiating influence behaviour deriving primarily from class background. Those from 
higher-status backgrounds are found to have greater interpersonal appeal than their less 
privileged rivals.  
However, class cultures have changed in recent decades, becoming more 
individualized and implicit (Bennett et al., 2009; Bottero, 2004; Gunz, Mayrhofer & Tolbert, 
2011). Class differences have been obscured through their ostensible replacement by an 
expanded middle class. In this, social scientists, including organization theorists, have been to 
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some degree complicit by tacitly going along with the censoring of class analysis by 
‘democratic creed’ (Charle, 1987, p. 11) and favouring neo-liberal ideology that class no 
longer matters, having forfeited its potential to determine life chances and career outcomes 
(Pinçon & Pinçon-Charlot, 2007). Clegg (1989, p. 3) points to the lack of ‘effective 
interchange’ between class analysis and organizational analysis, which have become 
disconnected. As Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) observe, the displacement of social class 
from the centre of European sociology occurred just when new dimensions of inequality were 
arising (Godechot, 2011). Bourdieu (1998) agrees with Boltanski (1982, p. 305) that it is 
fallacious to assume French society has been transformed into a ‘society of the middle 
classes’. The advent of a seemingly classless society has prevented closer scrutiny of 
intraclass differences, diverting attention from social processes driven by class and social 
stratification. Elites have been largely absent from class analysis (Savage et al., 2013), while 
the internal differentiation within social classes, ‘the secondary differences which, within 
each of the classes…separate class fractions’, are rarely examined in the literature (Bourdieu, 
1986, p. 114; Flemmen, 2012). The prominence of the corporate class, positioned at the apex 
of the organizational field and into which some from the lower orders have gained admission, 
serves paradoxically to mask intra-group class differences.   
Bourdieu (1987; 1998) did not seek to conduct a systematic social class analysis 
(Savage et al., 2005). However, his project aims precisely to unveil the mechanisms of 
domination which remain hidden from view (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007), revealing the 
implicit processes of social closure which foster and disguise inequality (Bottero, 2004). In 
Bourdieu’s (1998) view, to refute the existence of class is to deny the continuing principles of 
differentiation in society. His work has helped revitalize class analysis by drawing attention 
to the ways in which taste, culture and symbolic goods inform the reproduction of economic 
and social hierarchies (Pinçon & Pinçon-Charlot, 2002; Savage et al., 2013). For Bourdieu 
  14  
(1986, p. 101), life chances are objectively inscribed in the volume and composition of an 
individual’s capital. Social class is internalized as ‘class habitus’, conditioning behaviour and 
influencing the acquisition of an elevated status and positioning (or not). Detailed studies of 
the continuing role of social class in shaping the French corporate elite supported by 
extensive empirical data are lacking (Dezalay, 1995; Pinçon & Pinçon-Charlot, 1998). The 
literature has not articulated fully the extent to which social class forces still exert a tangible 
impact on career success at this level, with implications for attendant power differentials. The 
material effect of social class on an agent’s ‘trajectory in social space’, in terms of career 
progression and durability in the FoP, may be far-reaching despite its seeming invisibility 
(Bourdieu, 1987, p. 4; McLeod, O’Donohoe & Townley, 2009). Hence, we propose:  
Hypothesis 3: Social class serves as the ‘master variable’ in determining an agent’s 
entry into and continuation within the FoP.  
If our findings confirm the first two hypotheses, this would support the theoretical 
construction of the FoP as a social space structured by network interactions and dominated by 
hyper-agents. The third hypothesis suggests that social class serves as an underlying control 
variable that privileges those from higher-status backgrounds and curbs access to the FoP.  
  
Methodology  
Identifying corporate actors in the FoP   
Our study is based upon personal and career profiles of 1160 members of the French 
corporate elite: those serving as main board members, executives and non-executives  
(excepting employee representatives), of at least one of France’s top 100 largest companies 
on 1 January 1998. We detail the social origins, education, honours, corporate and 
extracorporate networks of all 1160 directors, focusing on their career trajectories between 
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1998 and 2004. We identify 386 of the 1160 individuals profiled, approximately one third, as 
hyper-agents: multi-positional actors within the FoP (Boltanski, 1973; Bourdieu, 1996). 
Business leaders qualifying as hyper-agents satisfy at least two of four criteria: (i) 
appointment as a top-tier executive (y1), CEO or Executive Chairman of a top 100 company, 
including those styled Président Directeur-Général (PDG) and Président du Directoire; (ii) a 
corporate networker (y2) defined as holding at least two board memberships of top 100 
French companies, or one top 100 company and at least two directorships of other large 
companies; (iii) an extra-corporate networker (y3) designated by membership of two or more 
national or international non-business boards; (iv) an entrepreneur (y4) with significant 
ownership rights at 25% or more of equity (Franks & Mayer, 1997). Application of the four 
differentiating criteria effectively divides the French corporate elite into two categories, those 
who become power-brokers at societal level (33%), and those whose careers are more 
confined to business (67%) (Comet & Finez, 2010).  
  This method of identifying members of the business elite active within the FoP 
recognizes that those holding high office in business have different power bases, and affirms 
that those with more than one power base are most likely to function effectively at a societal 
level (Boltanski, 1973). The four individual pathways (y1, y2, y3, y4) embrace different 
dimensions of power, capturing the definition of power as ‘command over resources’ in terms 
of corporate control and ownership (y1 and y4), while reflecting other dimensions of power, 
external networks and the power to convene (y2 and y3) (Lindsay, 2008).   
Naturally, the number of individuals identified as active within the FoP is dependent 
upon definitions and entry criteria. Requiring a minimum of two pathways is consistent with 
the literature (Bourdieu, 1996; Burt et al., 2000; Hjellbrekke et al., 2007), and identifies an 
exclusive group of 386 people. Raising the bar to three pathways would be overly restrictive 
in reducing the number qualifying to 128. This would exclude, inter alia, Jacques de 
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Larosière de Champfeu (former Head of the IMF), which seems unreasonable. Including 
more companies or relaxing the definitions for corporate or extra-corporate networker would 
have the opposite effect, but would be inconsistent with what is known already about the high 
concentration of power in elite corporate circles (Maclean et al., 2010).  
Conceptual framework  
Any two or more of the four individual pathways can be combined, and thus there are ten 
observed modes of entry into the FoP. These combined pathways are interdependent. Top-tier 
directors, for example, are more likely to be singled out for appointment to other corporate 
and non-corporate boards. Moreover, variables of choice like education may be influenced by 
exogenous factors like social class and gender, which we call variables of fate, given at birth 
and determined outside the model. Both types of variables, choice and fate, can influence 
pathways to power, as expressed in Figure 1.   
[FIGURE 1 HERE]  
Method of sampling, data collection and coding  
The top 100 French companies were identified by computing an equally-weighted composite 
measure of size based on total capital employed, turnover, profit-before-tax, and employment 
(Grant, 1997). Following Zajac and Westphal (1996), the seven-year study period was 
deemed sufficiently long to model dynamic effects within the FoP such as transitions between 
career pathways and survival rates.2 To profile individual members of the elite, data were 
gathered from five main sources: company annual reports; Le Guide des Etats Majors;  
Who’s Who in France; extensive web searches, including company websites, Business Week, 
Forbes and the Financial Times; newspaper and periodical articles. Two of the authors coded 
the dataset, debating and reconciling difficult cases as necessary, including any partly 
subjective judgements such as parental social class, to ensure agreement.  
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Definition and construction of variables  
Following Halsey (1995), a four-way classification was adopted for social class: upper, 
upper-middle, lower-middle, and lower class. Classification was undertaken mainly on the 
basis of parental occupation (Bourdieu, 1987; Denord et al., 2011); supplemented by 
information on schooling, place of upbringing, and family circumstances. Upper class (1) was 
reserved for those whose parents held a leading position in society or owned sizeable (≥1%) 
equity stakes in top French companies. Upper-middle class (2) was applied to top 
professionals including lawyers, doctors, engineers, senior state officials, and senior business 
people. Lower-middle class (3) was applied to white-collar occupations including teachers, 
sales people, lesser officials and technicians; while lower class (4) was reserved for parental 
occupations like worker, miner and van driver.   
Birthplace was coded as falling into one of eight French regions, with additional 
categories for those born in a French colony or abroad. Educational data were coded by 
attendance (or not) at an elite school and attendance (or not) at one or more elite higher 
education (HE) institution. Many individuals attended more than one secondary school, with 
substantial numbers educated locally before preparing for competitive examinations (in 
classes préparatoires) for entry into elite HE institutions. Top academic and professional 
qualifications by level and type were recorded. Data on state honours were gathered for the 
Légion d’Honneur (LdH) and the Ordre National du Mérite (ONM), which share the same 
ranking system and had similar frequencies in 2002: chevaliers (77%, 79%), officiers (19%, 
17%), commandeurs (3%, 3%), grands officiers (0.95%, 0.92), and grand-croix (0.05%, 
0.08%). Membership of a grand corps is, as mentioned, a signifier of inclusion at the highest 
level within the French civic elite. Foremost among these are the Inspection des Finances and 
the Corps des Mines (Bourdieu, 1996; Suleiman, 1997). Known membership data were also 
gathered for the Conseil d’Etat, Cour des Comptes, and the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées.  
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Individuals were classified according to career type: those who spend their careers 
wholly or primarily in the private sector; those who began their careers within government 
departments before entering business; and those who began in a profession before entering 
the corporate sector. The number of top 100 company main board memberships and non-top 
100 main board memberships held by an individual in 1998 and 2004 are recorded, but 
subsidiary board memberships are excluded. Non-top 100 French companies are included if 
classified as large companies by inclusion in Le Guide des Etats Majors. Given our interest in 
the FoP, the specific nature of the power base in which each director is practically rooted was 
recorded, including academia, banking and finance, law, the corporate sector, family trusts, 
and the State. Likewise, the type and extent of engagement in external networks is noted, 
including involvement in charities, public bodies, business organizations, higher education, 
sports and culture. Overall network size is captured by the total number of corporate and 
extra-corporate board memberships. Further details of variables, definitions and coding 
scheme are provided in the Appendix.  
  
Empirical Analysis  
Entering the FoP  
In Table 1, we summarize our findings on discrete and multiple pathways to power. Part A 
relates to entry qualifications. Of the 1160 elite members, 17% qualified as top-tier executives 
of a top 100 French company (y1). Nearly all (91%) entered the FoP. Those qualifying as 
corporate networkers (y2) were more numerous (32% of cohort), 84% gaining admission to 
the FoP. An even larger number (48%) qualified as extra-corporate networkers (y3), but only 
68% entered the FoP. The smallest number (4.5%) qualified by having significant ownership 
(y4) rights in large companies, of whom 90% entered the FoP.   
In Part B of the table, frequencies are displayed in rank order for the ten pathway 
combinations pursued by those active within the FoP at the core of the French business elite. 
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The largest group (47%) are senior executives beneath the rank of CEO in large companies 
with extensive networks within and beyond business: the corporate and extra-corporate 
networkers who unite the system by prosecuting the agendas of the most powerful agents, the 
top-tier executives and owner-executives who combine three or four pathways. The most 
numerous (24%) are top-tier corporate and extra-corporate networkers who lead large 
companies and serve as board members of other companies and organizations outside the 
corporate sector. In terms of power, these individuals are rivalled only by the 15 (4%) top-tier 
owner corporate and extra-corporate networkers who bestride the FoP in France. 
Interestingly, a large minority of top-tier executives and business owners do not serve as 
corporate networkers, preferring to channel their energies within their own companies and 
build extra-corporate networks.   
[TABLE 1 HERE]  
  The emerging picture of the FoP is one of a small population of highly networked 
hyper-agents, composed of executives and non-executives, who connect the most important 
business and non-business organizations in France. Of their number, the top-tier corporate 
executives and owner-executives are pre-eminent. Our task in what follows is to identify and 
explain the factors that elevate them to positions of such authority.  
Descriptive findings  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables and reveals considerable variation 
within the sample. For example, attendance at an elite school (56%) is far from ubiquitous, 
and award of a state honour proves exceptional rather than commonplace, and therefore is not 
an ‘entrance ticket’ to the FoP. Nevertheless, there is homogeneity with respect to nationality 
(90% French) and gender (96% male), underlining the importance of national processes for 
reproducing elites (Hartmann, 2011), and confirming the ‘very slow progress of parity’  
(Dudouet & Joly, 2010, p. 40).   
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[TABLE 2 HERE]  
By dividing the sample into those active (386) and not active (774) within the FoP, 
significant differences are detectable using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). 
Table 3 reports on differences between the two groups overall (All) and variable-by-variable 
based on the Wilks’ lamda test statistic. The overall test (All) exhibits a p-value of 0.000, 
which indicates that the two groups are dissimilar, even though distinct differences exist for 
just a few variables such as grand corps and nationality. Counter-intuitively, entering the FoP 
does not seem primarily to be related to differences in education nor, at first sight, to depend 
on social class. However, descriptive statistics cannot reveal the inherent interdependence 
between pathways to power; the alleged endogeneity of the variables of choice necessitating 
closer scrutiny.  
[TABLE 3 HERE]  
Endogeneity: choice or fate?    
In contrast to prior social network research (Coignard & Guichard, 2000; François, 2010; 
Scott, 1991), our interest lies in modelling the inherent endogeneity between socio-economic 
variables. Education, for example, while commonly perceived to be critical in determining 
social outcomes, is not an exogenous variable because attendance at an elite school may in 
turn be related to social class, gender or birthplace. Exogenous variables like age and social 
class, conversely, are determined outside our model and taken as ‘fallen from heaven’. In 
developing our statistical models (static and dynamic), it is therefore necessary to identify 
those variables affected by endogeneity. There are two main issues. First, the likely 
interrelationship between variables of fate and choice might cause multicollinearity. In this 
case, however, the computed variance inflation factors (VIF) peak at 1.64 (pb_ft), which is 
beneath the critical level of five, indicating that multicollinearity is not a concern. Second, it 
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is possible that any model might suffer from an endogeneity bias, since operating in the FoP 
or pursuing a certain pathway affects variables of choice.  
Our aim is to identify the true underlying factors that help secure and maintain a 
position in the FoP; so understanding the impact of variables of fate on education and other 
variables is crucial, since ‘the requiring of a given diploma can be a way of demanding a 
particular social origin’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 102). Accordingly, we ran two types of models to 
measure the impact of variables of fate (z) on variables of choice (x). As variables of choice 
are binary, we apply logit models estimated using Maximum-Likelihood (Greene, 2008). 
Table 4 shows the results of logit models for all variables of choice using the pseudo 
Rsquared to indicate overall model fit applying a threshold of 25%. Our second measure, the 
area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC), provides an indication of the 
accuracy of logit models. If the ROC statistic exceeds 0.8, the model prediction is accurate, 
implying that fate explains the particular variable of choice. Both measures point to the same 
variables exhibiting a high degree of dependence on variables of fate. In particular, elite 
schooling (pseudo R2 = 26%; ROC = 0.83) and having a family trust as a power base (pseudo 
R2 = 39%; ROC = 0.93) appear to be driven by variables of fate. The statistics also 
misleadingly suggest that obtaining the highest honour (grand-croix) is dependent on 
variables of fate (pseudo R2 = 37%; ROC = 0.91). However, receiving the highest state 
honour more likely depends upon entering the FoP than vice versa, and provides an example 
of endogeneity bias; thus award of the honour is discounted as an explanatory variable. The 
truly endogenous relationships identified are captured in the structural equation model (SEM) 
developed below.  
[TABLE 4 HERE]  
  22  
Structural equation model: the static model  
We adopt an SEM to capture the endogenous nature of variables of choice and the 
interrelation between different pathways, and define the probability of entering the FoP as 
one minus the probability of not entering, which facilitates the model. Equation 1 
demonstrates that the probability of entering the FoP depends on the probability of not 
fulfilling any of the four criteria, or of fulfilling just one criterion.  
PFOP1PFOP1Py1 y2 y3y4 Py1 y2 y3 y4  
 (1)  
  no criterion fulfilled  
Py1 y2 y3 y4 Py1 y2 y3 y4 Py1 y2 y3 y4  
As the individual pathways are interrelated – for example, qualifying as a top-tier director 
might influence the probability of satisfying other criteria – we need to model the conditional 
probabilities of the four pathways. We apply an SEM with six equations that reflects the four 
pathways labelled yj (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) and the two endogenous variables of choice, attending an 
elite school (eliteschl) and having a family trust as power base (pb_ft). The four pathways 
depend on variables of choice (x) and variables of fate (z). The two endogenous variables, 
eliteschl and pb_ft (v) can affect the pathways followed, but also depend on variables of fate.  
Therefore, variables of fate can have a direct effect and an indirect effect through endogenous variables 
of choice. We use a full-information Maximum-Likelihood (FIML) estimation, which assumes a logistic 
distribution as the four pathways and the two endogenous variables are binary. The FIML model is 
estimated in one step, and has the advantage over the standard two-stage procedure in preventing error 
terms being carried over from the first step. Equation  
2 specifies the SEM, the index i referring to individual agents:  
(2)  
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  The results of the SEM, displayed in Table 5 together with various goodness-of-fit 
measures, are revealing. First, there is confirmation that the four pathways to power are 
interrelated. As might be expected, becoming CEO of a top 100 French company (y1) is more 
likely if agents satisfy other criteria such as involvement in corporate and extra-corporate 
networks. However, being a networker outside the business sphere (y3) is not driven by board 
memberships in the private sector or vice versa (y2).   
  Secondly, we can identify a variety of direct effects of explanatory variables on each 
of the pathways. Elite schooling has a significant positive impact on becoming a corporate 
networker, but does not influence the likelihood of pursuing any other pathway. Graduating 
from an elite HE institution, like a grande école, facilitates becoming a CEO, but does not 
determine other pathways. The type of qualification obtained and subject studied were not 
found to impact significantly on any of the four pathways. Membership of a grand corps, 
whose continuing importance is underscored by Dudouet and Joly (2010), has a highly 
significant positive impact on becoming a networker outside the business sphere (y3).  
Individuals coming from backgrounds in public administration and the professions and those with a career 
platform or power base in finance are advantaged in becoming corporate networkers (y2). The direct effect 
of social class is striking in the case of extra-corporate networkers (y3). Gender does not have a direct 
influence on pathway choices, although the SEM detects an indirect effect, since women are less likely 
to attend elite schools, restricting their chances of becoming a corporate networker (y2) and entering the 
FoP (Comet & Finez, 2010).   
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Thirdly, we observe highly significant indirect effects of the two variables of fate 
identified earlier, elite schooling and having a power base in a family trust. Bourdieu (1996) 
considers the grandes écoles and the FoP to be homologous, the structure of the field of 
established schools reflecting that of the FoP itself. Being upper or upper-middle class 
sizeably increases the likelihood of attending one of France’s top four grandes écoles, namely 
ENA, Polytechnique, the Institut des Sciences-Politiques de Paris (‘Sciences-Po’), and the 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) (Denord et al., 2011; Hartmann, 2000). As 
many as 28 individuals from class 1 attended Polytechnique, equivalent to 12.9% of all agents 
from this social group. Class 2 agents fared much better, 32% studying there. Our findings 
suggest that the upper-middle classes dominate the grandes écoles (Comet & Finez, 2010; 
Suleiman, 1997). Individuals from the lower classes fared noticeably worse, with just two 
admitted to Polytechnique, six to ENA, one to Sciences-Po, and none to HEC. Having a 
family trust as a power base is likewise driven by social class, and by default heightens the 
probability that the individual concerned is an entrepreneur (y4).   
[TABLE 5 HERE]  
Explaining career trajectories: the dynamic model  
The SEM results are valuable, but they tell us little about career dynamics within the elite and 
the FoP. In order to understand better the drivers of career transitions and trajectories a 
dynamic model is required that utilizes the full potential of our dataset. At the outset we 
observe that many agents (483) maintained pathways between 1998 and 2004, but many 
others changed pathways (396), and 281 individuals exited due to death or retirement. Based 
on these trajectories, we can determine a matrix that captures the transition probabilities 
between pathways. Given four pathways, we model 16 transitions using a generalized linear 
model (GLM) based on the matrix regression model outlined by Robertson (1990).3 There is 
an evident need to reduce the number of explanatory variables, otherwise there would be a 
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risk of over-identification from having 16 equations and 51 explanatory variables (Table 5), 
which would mean 816 coefficients and greatly reduced degrees of freedom. Hence we draw 
upon the SEM model to identify a subset of variables with most explanatory power: 
education (elieschl, elitehe), social class (class_1, class_2, class_3, class_4), gender  
(h_gender), age (age98) and birthplace (h_afil, h_region). To illustrate the model, a transition 
matrix for the average agent which identifies the variables affecting transition probabilities is 
plotted in Figure 2.4  
[FIGURE 2 HERE]  
The arrows in Figure 2 indicate transitions between pathways, while the associated 
numbers denote transition probabilities expressed as percentages. The related symbols 
highlight significant coefficients at the 99% confidence level; plus and minus signs 
representing positive and negative impacts respectively. The four social classes are labeled 
C1, C2, C3 and C4; initial pathways are designated Y1, Y2, Y3 and Y4; A refers to age98, F 
to h_afil and G to h_gender. It is confirmed that agents were largely able to maintain their 
positions during the seven-year period. For example, 62% of top tier executives (y1) remained 
in position, while 8% became corporate networkers (y2) and 14% became extra-corporate 
networkers (y3). The dynamic model also indicates the factors influencing each transition. For 
instance, the transition from top-tier executive (y1) to corporate networker (y2) is positively 
affected by being a corporate networker and an extra-corporate networker (y3) in 1998 
(symbol Y2(+), Y3(+)). Hence, the CEO of a top 100 company (y1) who was also director of 
other top 100 companies (y2) and organizations outside the business sphere (y3) was more 
likely to remain a corporate networker after leaving an executive position.  
An important finding is that the third pathway plays a vital role in influencing 
transition probabilities: having networks outside the business sphere helps an agent remain a 
corporate networker (y2). The third pathway also affects the transition between the first and 
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second pathways, confirming our premise that pathways are interdependent. Critically, we 
can observe the direction of influence and confirm the pivotal importance of establishing 
networks beyond the business world. The dynamic model supports Hypothesis 1: external 
networks outside the corporate domain influence the likelihood of a transition into other 
pathways, bolstering power. The model confirms that career trajectories are partly determined 
by following other pathways, underlining the importance of hyper-agency as stated in  
Hypothesis 2: following multiple pathways simultaneously consolidates power.  
The model reveals that social class counts most when pursuing pathway three, since 
agents from class 4 are less likely to remain on the third pathway (symbol C4(-)), and 
accessing it from the first two pathways depends on social class. Therefore, class has an effect 
on pathways one and two through the ability to form networks beyond the business domain. 
This supports Hypothesis 3, with social class emerging as the ‘master variable’ for pathway 
three, thereby exercising an influence on pathways one and two. Moreover, gender and 
nationality, being male and French, likewise facilitates joining the third pathway (Martinache, 
2011). Ownership, however, does not affect any transition probability and plays a relatively 
minor role in determining career trajectories.   
  
Hypotheses and empirical findings  
Confirming Hypothesis 1: the role of networks outside the business sphere  
The FoP cannot be observed directly; however, by using observable pathways, our model can 
test theoretical predictions. The literature stresses the importance of networks beyond 
corporate boundaries (Collins-Dogrul, 2012; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Scott, 1991), as 
represented by pathway three. The static and dynamic models reveal that the third pathway 
makes retaining a position as corporate networker more likely, enhancing staying power. It 
also increases an individual’s chances of moving from the position of corporate networker to 
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a top executive role. This emphasizes the pivotal role of external networks in maintaining 
power.  
Confirming Hypothesis 2: the benefit of hyper-agency  
The static and dynamic models reveal that individuals who follow several pathways 
concurrently increase their likelihood of retaining their position. This underlines the strategic 
benefit of hyper-agency, which shores up the individual’s main role and thereby fosters 
longevity in the FoP.   
Confirming Hypothesis 3: the importance of social class  
Both the static and dynamic models highlight the importance of class origin, through its 
impact on variables of choice and the capacity to participate in corporate and extra-corporate 
networks, in becoming and remaining a multi-positional actor within the FoP. Figure 3 is 
illustrative. It confirms the advantages enjoyed by those from the upper echelons (classes 1 
and 2) with respect to all pathways, and highlights the specific advantage enjoyed in 
extracorporate networking (y3) by higher-status agents vis-à-vis lower-class aspirants. The 
general pattern for class 1 is repeated for classes 2 and 3, although the proportions following 
individual pathways systematically decrease on descending the social scale. Class 4, 
however, exhibits a different pattern, suggesting that lower-class agents with low stocks of 
capital on commencing their journey concentrate their careers in the corporate sector, 
remaining dedicated executives within the confines of their businesses, but often failing to 
reach the summit, achieving next-best positions. This implies that meritocracy is working in  
France. For those who can secure entry to an elite establishment, ‘educational socialization’ 
helps compensate for the absence of a high-status background, familiarizing them with its 
norms and networks (Reay, Crozier & Clayton, 2009, p. 1105; Palmer & Barber, 2001).  
However, there is a caveat: while it may oil the wheels, it is unlikely to secure entry to the 
FoP (Comet & Finez, 2010), for reasons we explore below. Conversely, for agents whose 
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activities extend beyond corporate boundaries, cementing their position within the FoP as 
extra-corporate networkers, a high-status background emerges as the ‘trump card’ (Bourdieu,  
1993).  
[FIGURE 3 HERE]  
Discussion and Conclusion  
The approach of organization theorists to social class over recent decades has been 
characterized by a ‘silence of critique’ (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007, p. xiii). We believe this 
to be mistaken because class, far from being a spent force in determining life chances, 
continues to exert a material influence on career itineraries and outcomes. However, the 
extent to which inherited capital continues to determine who occupies the top strata is 
misrecognized. This matters, because the occupants of command posts hold positions of 
power over capital, holding sway in contemporary society in setting agendas and capturing 
resources; the exercise of corporate power going hand-in-hand with the exercise of economic 
power (Bourdieu, 2011). For lower-class aspirants, class operates as a constraining force, 
inducing a ‘capping effect’, such that they often achieve second-tier positions, failing to 
emerge as hyper-agents (Bourdieu, 1996; Hartmann, 2000) and prevented from accessing  
‘“forbidden” spaces of power’ (Courpasson, Dany & Clegg, 2012, p. 811). That this remains 
largely unnoticed is partly because it is concealed by the success of talented challengers in 
almost making it to the very top, in turn implying their ‘doxic acceptance’ (Bourdieu, 1987,  
p. 16) of the given social order, as products of the system of domination they are (mistakenly) 
presumed to subvert (Courpasson et al., 2012; Fleming & Spicer, 2007). Social class forces 
are implicated in invisible but on-going power relationships at this elevated level. The 
hyperelite layer of the corporate elite is not stand-alone but rests on and is buttressed by those 
who almost make it to the top. Scrutiny of the impact of social class in regulating entry into 
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the FoP is all the more necessary because such spaces of power remain inaccessible to the 
vast majority of people (Pinçon & Pinçon-Charlot, 2007).  
Our results yield useful insights into the social processes at work. We find, for 
example, that dominant agents from the most elevated social class do not always extend their 
reach furthest. Individuals from the upper-middle class often do best, dominating the grandes 
écoles. It is here that the competing society-wide logics of birth and meritocracy are 
seamlessly blended, becoming complementary (Thornton, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), 
and exercising an additive or cumulative effect on life chances, combining direct and indirect 
effects. Agents from class two are the ‘chief beneficiaries of… the reproduction of social and 
cultural dominance’ (Bennett et al., 2009, p. 177). In succeeding educationally without being 
excessively prominent in the social hierarchy, displaying the dispositions of class-based 
advantage without overtly owing their advancement to their background but to their 
intelligence, they reap a singular profit of legitimacy (Bourdieu & Saint-Martin, 1973; 
Suchman, 1995). As Savage et al. (2005, p. 38) bluntly put it, despite omnipresent 
contestation, the ‘advantaged middle classes always win’.  
An elite education is especially valuable when a high-status background is lacking. 
However, we found no guarantee that attending an elite establishment represents a glide-path 
to the FoP; attendance at a grande école is not the ultimate discriminator it is assumed to be, 
since many people attend them. This implies that educational socialization alone, without the 
boost of social class, is unlikely to lead to hyper-agency. Education, while compensatory for 
lower-class aspirants, does not compensate entirely. The espoused societal logic of 
meritocracy is not the prevailing logic (Argyris, 1977; Thornton, 2002) when ‘the important 
thing is to know without ever having learnt’ (Hartmann, 2000, p. 243); the alternative to this 
being a protracted, uncertain process of initiation and co-option (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 68).  
Social class matters most with respect to pathway three, extra-corporate networking.  
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Here, the ‘aristocratism of birth’ trounces ‘the meritocratism of academic success’ (Bourdieu, 
1996, p. 335). Education for higher-status agents is justificatory, as the ‘advantaged seek to 
establish… that their unequal positions are deserved’ (Bottero, 2004, p. 996). Inheritance 
must be seen to be merited to be deemed legitimate (Pinçon & Pinçon-Charlot, 2007). An 
extra-corporate networker who is a member of a grand corps increases his or her chances of 
entering the FoP by an additional 3%. If s/he is also of high social status, the chances of 
accessing the FoP rise by a further 4%. The lubricant of high status eases the entry of 
extracorporate networkers into the FoP, and cements their position within it. This is 
important, because it is pathway three that leads most directly to the clubs, boardrooms and 
meeting places which form the ‘playing-fields’ of the FoP, through which agents engage with 
other facets, facilitating hyper-agency (Bourdieu, 2011; Giddens, 1984). The preponderance 
of ‘old-timers’ in this pathway is indicative of a social class effect that functions to prolong 
occupancy and bolster agency in the FoP.   
An important question is why should this be so? Why does extra-corporate 
networking exhibit such a striking social class effect? Reference-group dynamics play a 
critical role here (Bottero, 2004). Such agents benefit from the reassuring mutual resemblance 
or in-group bias which renders them attractive to their peers, fostering mutual recognition 
(Ekman, 2012). Put simply, agents from the uppermost classes recognize one another and 
seek each other out. For Bourdieu (1996, p. 317), mutual recognition is the guiding principle 
of upper-class groups, since:   
‘by recognizing themselves in these plenipotentiaries, by recognizing them as 
endowed with full power to speak and act in their name, [such agents] recognize 
themselves as members of the class, and in doing so, confer upon it the only form of 
existence a group can possess’. (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 10)  
  
In other words, high-status agents choose one another, and are chosen in return, 
forming a corporate class in their own right. This point is confirmed by Mills (1956, pp. 
1389): ‘Time and time again, in close-ups of the executive career, we observe how men in the 
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same circles choose one another’. For Mills (1956, p. 141), joining and engaging in the FoP is 
not a matter of competence, but one of ‘conformity with the criteria of those who have 
already succeeded. To be compatible with the top men is to act like them, to look like them, 
to think like them’. The playing-fields of the FoP are not level or neutral. In selecting fellow 
board members, agents enlist colleagues they can trust, whose behaviour is indicative of value 
similarity, and with whom they can form lasting alliances (Stern & Westphal, 2010; Westphal 
& Zajac, 1995). Collaborators who exhibit a shared worldview are perceived as more likely to 
adopt similar strategic positions (Howe, 1978). Stern and Westphal (2010) note that outside 
directors of high-status origins are more likely to partake in subtle forms of opinion 
conformity, leading to the garnering of extra-corporate board appointments. Such high-status 
agents are predisposed to function as ‘agents of connection’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 305), unlike 
lower-status agents who, benefitting less from similarity-attraction bias, are less likely to be 
chosen, remaining within the corporate domain and keeping ‘their (relative) distance’ 
(Bourdieu, 1987, p. 5). This ‘structure of affinity or aversion’ serves to draw them together 
(or not) as extra-corporate networkers and fellow-travellers in the FoP (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 7).   
Interestingly, Bourdieu’s discussion of affinity or aversion in the FoP recalls the 
notion of ‘elective affinities’ proposed by Weber (1948/1971, p. 284), on whose work  
Bourdieu drew to inform his analysis of power and its impact on life chances (Clegg, 1989;  
Clegg, Boreham & Dow, 1986; Clegg et al., 2006). According to this, human relationships 
mirror processes of attraction and repulsion which govern the aggregation and disaggregation 
of chemical elements, exhibiting differing inclinations to merge with each other (Howe, 
1978; Jost, Frederico & Napier, 2009; Löwy, 2004). With respect to accumulating 
extracorporate board appointments, such affinities work, perhaps subliminally, to advantage 
some  
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‘through an elective aggregation of those of equal privilege’ while subtly disadvantaging 
others (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 15). This notion of an elective affinity provides a useful metaphor 
to help elucidate the processes of class-based mutual attraction that bring together high-status 
agents in durable extra-corporate alliances within the FoP, while simultaneously excluding 
others (Westphal & Zajac, 1995), highlighting the potency and natural pulling power of the 
recognition of a shared class habitus in such circles (Bourdieu, 1990; Hartmann, 2000).  
Our findings confirm the three hypotheses advanced concerning extra-corporate 
networks, hyper-agency and social class; laying the foundations for our unifying theoretical 
exposition of the enduring importance of the social class effect on the FoP. The main 
limitation of our study is that its empirical findings pertain to just one nation, and it might 
reasonably be asked how typical this is. Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), however, argue for 
limiting analysis to one nation over a defined time-span for findings to be meaningful. 
Moreover, the conceptual framework we present to inform study of the FoP could be applied 
to other countries. Comparison with other governance regimes might further illuminate the 
cultural specificities of the French business system (Genieys, 2005). A second potential 
limitation is more technical and relates to our treatment of time. Including a panel data 
analysis might perhaps have better captured agents’ entry to and exit from the FoP. However, 
most explanatory variables such as education and social class do not change with time. We 
elected instead to explore career trajectories and transitions by means of our dynamic model, 
which yields insightful results.  
Our contribution to the study of corporate elites and their exercise of power at the 
pinnacle of society is threefold. First, we add to research which conceptualizes processes of 
hierarchy and internal differentiation within social strata by elaborating and implementing 
Bourdieu’s concept of the FoP. Critical here is the distinction we draw between a majority of 
corporate leaders whose careers focus on the business domain and a minority who assume a 
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role as society-wide playmakers (Denord et al., 2011; François, 2010; Reed, 2012). The 
methodology we apply to identify dominant agents active within the FoP is innovative, 
requiring an extensive custom-designed dataset to discern the pathway combinations followed 
by those who acquire this elevated positioning. The static and dynamic econometric models 
we develop, unlike those applied in prior elite studies (e.g. Useem & Karabel, 1986), 
recognize the inherent endogeneity of socio-economic variables and career pathways, 
emphasizing the interdependence between pathways and capturing the multidirectional 
causality between trajectories. This approach allows us to identify the direct and indirect 
effects of key explanatory variables and to explain the transition probabilities between 
pathways, highlighting the critical importance of pathway three pursued by extra-corporate 
networkers in determining hyper-agency. Most importantly, we demonstrate the on-going 
significance of the social class effect in the selection of hyper-agents who hold sway within 
the FoP in France.  
Our second contribution, building on the first, goes to the heart of corporate elite 
selection theory. We demonstrate that the subtle, sophisticated preferences which operate 
unseen to influence selection processes and hence preserve the composition of the French 
corporate elite are ultimately class-based. While other scholars have highlighted the effect of 
ingratiating behaviour (Stern & Westphal, 2010) and demographic similarity such as age 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995) on securing board appointments, our insights accentuate the nature 
of higher social status as a magnetizing force, with drawing power, instrumental in anchoring 
position and prolonging activity in the FoP. In contrast to the widespread assumption that 
class differences have withered away (Bourdieu, 1987), we show that social origin remains a 
key driver in furthering careers – including at this level where the obviousness of success 
obscures visible signs of a continuing principle of differentiation (Flemmen, 2012; Palmer & 
Barber, 2001) – markedly improving the chances of selection to the corporate and 
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extracorporate networks which facilitate hyper-agency. Power contains a demand for 
recognition (Bourdieu, 2011). Through social interaction dynamics of mutual recognition, 
which advantage higher-status agents to the detriment of lower-class aspirants, whereby 
agents become classifiers and are classified in return (Bourdieu, 1987), we show that social 
class plays a persistent role in the selection mechanisms which determine who holds sway in 
the corporate elite and, ultimately, society-at-large.  
Our third and final contribution is to help re-connect class analysis with 
organizational analysis, from which it has become disengaged (Clegg, 1989). We propose that 
research on social class broadly speaking should be re-integrated with the study of 
organizations and their role in shaping and structuring oligarchical fields of power. Our paper 
highlights the new texture of social class. The disappearance of class from organizational 
theory is partly due to the absence of more nuanced class categories grounded in 
contemporary social and organizational realities (Savage et al., 2013). Bourdieu (1986; 1998) 
emphasizes the need to construct classes according to meaningful divisions within the social 
world – to identify an objective class in terms of a set of agents who share homogeneous 
conditions of existence and common properties, in the form of possessions and power, often 
legally guaranteed. The common objectified properties shared by top directors in the 
corporate field create an organizational social class or a corporate-based social class, 
engendering an ‘[haute] bourgeoisie of work’ (Le Wita, 1994, p. 18). Hyper-agents inhabit a 
practical world of boards, networks, committees and colloquia which comprise the 
‘structuring structures’ for the power elite of corporate capitalism (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53; 
Giddens, 1984). This corporate class is organically unified by virtue of an ‘incomparable 
plurality of principles of domination (power or type of capital), which limits competition 
between power holders and promotes partial and multiple alliances amongst them’ (Bourdieu,  
2011, p. 137), uniting rivalrous interests in a common ideology.   
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Bourdieu’s approach to class is a composite one encompassing the institutional 
foundations of capital formation. Particular forms of capital are endowed with causal power; 
while inequalities, like types of capital, are not static but accrue over time through processes 
which implicate institutional systems and individual agency (Savage et al., 2005). The 
institutions of consecration play a vital role in funnelling or filtering opportunities for access, 
legitimizing forms of power by according (or withholding) recognition. The organic solidarity 
of this class engages elite agents and institutions in legitimizing circuits of exchange which 
are increasingly extensive and complex (Bourdieu, 2011). Bourdieu’s (1998) world is not 
only relational; it is also material. Oligarchic reproduction is accomplished by agents in 
conjunction with specific rules, frameworks and objects which are teleologically charged, 
legitimizing differences that are socially relevant (Bourdieu, 1990; Orlikowski, 2007). The 
objectification of the principles of domination occurs indirectly through the ‘intermediary of 
mechanisms’, being ‘mediated by things’ (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 137). The effect of this process 
of objectification of class-based differences in qualifications, memberships, symbolic and 
material goods is to conceal the arbitrary nature of their power while institutionalizing the 
principles which inform stratification (Le Wita, 1994) – such that a particular career path may 
appear objectively destined, unsettling the divide between logics of choice and fate through 
the assumption of an ‘objective destiny… imposed by practical reference to the modal 
trajectory in the class of origin’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 110). This conjoint work of agents, rules 
and the objectified properties which legitimize their activities in the organizational field and 
beyond is what brings class and organizations closer.  
Reconnecting class and organizations illuminates our understanding of the 
mechanisms which sustain corporate power in France today, including the influence of class 
on social action. The more class-specific interests of the upper echelons are not articulated as 
explicit goals but remain largely concealed, woven into a rhetoric of shared values and 
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common purpose of the French national interest. That the uppermost tier of the corporate elite 
is drawn primarily from higher-status groups is a matter of theoretical substance and practical 
relevance, for what is at stake is the right to have voice in policy-making and resource 
allocation (Hartmann, 2002). A research agenda that combines class and organization theory 
might shed fresh light on unrecognized mechanisms of power inequalities across generations 
as well as social strata. To misrecognize the ways in which social class continues to inform 
processes of hierarchical reproduction is to condone the enduring principles of differentiation 
and accentuation of class-based inequities in society today.  
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Notes  
1. All translations are by the authors.  
2. The period was one of increasing European integration, epitomized by the adoption of 
the euro in 1999; increasing foreign ownership of the equity of leading French 
companies; continuing corporate governance initiatives; and the implementation of 
the Nouvelles Régulations Economiques leading to the loi de sécurité financière of 
2003, recommending that the role of PDG become two separate roles, CEO and 
Chairman. The end of the millennium witnessed a spate of mega-mergers, including 
hostile takeovers by French firms of fellow rivals, creating TotalFina-Elf and 
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BNPParibas; and several Franco-German mergers, producing EADS and Aventis. One 
might expect to see such far-reaching change reflected in the composition of the body 
of dominant agents active within the FoP (Dudouet & Grémont, 2007; François, 
2010).  
3. An ordered logit approach would suggest a natural order of the 16 transitions, which 
is not the case.  
4. Detailed estimation results can be provided by the authors upon request  
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Table 1: Qualifications and entry into the FoP  
Part A: Entry Qualifications (observations = 1160)   
Pathway  No. qualifying  %  
qualifying  
No. within  % within  
FoP  FoP  
Top-Tier Executive (y1)  198  17.1  180  90.9  
Corporate Networker (y2)  366  31.6  309  84.4  
Extra-Corporate Networker (y3)  555  47.8  379  68.3  
Ownership (y4)  52  
    
4.5  
  
47  
  
90.4  
  
Part B: Entrants into the Field of Power (386 of 1160)    
Type of actor in FoP  Pathway 
combination  
No. of 
entrants into 
FoP  
% of entrants 
into FoP  
Corporate & Extra-Corporate 
Networker  
y2+y3  182  47.2  
Top-Tier Corporate & 
ExtraCorporate Networker  
y1+y2+y3  94  24.4  
Top-Tier Extra-Corporate 
Networker  
y1+y3  58  15.0  
Top-Tier Owner Corporate & 
Extra-Corporate Networker  
y1+y2+y3+y4  15  3.9  
Owner Corporate & 
ExtraCorporate Networker  
y2+y3+y4  12  3.1  
Owner Extra-Corporate Networker  
  
y3+y4  12  3.1  
Top-Tier Owner Extra-Corporate 
Networker  
y1+y3+y4  6  1.6  
Top-Tier Corporate Networker  
  
y1+y2  5  1.3  
Top-Tier Owner Corporate 
Networker  
y1+y2+y4  1  0.3  
Top-Tier Owner  y1+y4  1  0.3  
  
  
  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (observations, mean, standard deviation)  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std  Variable  Obs  Mean  Std  
y1  1160  0.17  0.38  FIN  1160  0.22  0.41  
y2  1160  0.32  0.46  GMT  1160  0.24  0.43  
  45  
y3  1160  0.48  0.50  HRM  1160  0.02  0.15  
y4  1160  0.04  0.21  LAW  1160  0.03  0.17  
eliteschl  923  0.56  0.50  M_M  1160  0.07  0.25  
elitehe  1112  0.78  0.41  OWN  1160  0.02  0.15  
dis_ahss  1119  0.04  0.20  PAD  1160  0.08  0.27  
dis_bea  1119  0.42  0.49  tyear  1160  1988.5  9.50  
dis_lop  1119  0.12  0.32  tage  1160  45.79  8.19  
dis_sem  1119  0.37  0.48  t98  1160  1.24  0.77  
qual_fd  1119  0.11  0.31  oth98  1160  0.89  1.32  
qual_hd  1119  0.73  0.44  t04  1160  0.71  0.84  
qual_phd  1119  0.11  0.31  oth04  1160  0.91  1.24  
profqual  1118  0.53  0.50  pb_ac  1160  0.01  0.11  
pqtype_af  1119  0.11  0.32  pb_bf  1160  0.06  0.23  
pqtype_ag  1119  0.01  0.11  pb_b  1160  0.72  0.45  
pqtype_bi  1119  0.01  0.07  pb_ft  1160  0.16  0.36  
pqtype_et  1119  0.27  0.45  pb_l  1160  0.01  0.08  
pqtype_l  1119  0.06  0.23  pb_s  1160  0.06  0.23  
pqtype_mba  1119  0.06  0.25  exnet  1160  1.44  1.19  
chevaliers  1160  0.17  0.38  cbd  1160  0.15  0.35  
officiers  1160  0.13  0.34  pbody  1160  0.46  0.50  
commandeurs  1160  0.07  0.26  bassoc  1160  0.51  0.50  
grand_off  1160  0.01  0.11  edbd  1160  0.22  0.41  
grand_croix  1160  0.00  0.06  asbd  1160  0.11  0.31  
corps_1  1160  0.01  0.07  con_no  1160  3.57  2.43  
corps_2  1160  0.05  0.23  con_span  1160  2.86  1.41  
corps_3  1160  0.02  0.13  class_1  1160  0.19  0.39  
corps_4  1160  0.05  0.22  class_2  1160  0.40  0.49  
corps_5  1160  0.02  0.15  class_3  1160  0.30  0.46  
type_b  1159  0.72  0.45  class_4  1160  0.05  0.22  
type_pa_b  1159  0.24  0.43  h_gender  1160  0.96  0.21  
type_p_b  1159  0.04  0.19  h_region  1160  0.31  0.46  
ACAD  1160  0.02  0.13  age98  1160  55.39  9.50  
EST  1160  0.26  0.44  h_afil  1159  0.90  0.30  
  
Table 3: MANOVA: Test statistics for differences between groups (in versus out of FoP)  
Variable  Wilks' 
lamda  
p-value  Variable  Wilks' 
lamda  
p-value  
eliteschl  1.000  0.946  HRM  1.000  0.833  
elitehe  1.000  0.588  LAW  1.000  0.546  
dis_ahss  1.000  0.893  M_M  1.000  0.632  
dis_bea  1.000  0.790  OWN  0.999  0.394  
dis_lop  1.000  0.504  PAD  0.999  0.432  
dis_sem  1.000  0.674  tyear  1.000  0.363  
qual_fd  1.000  0.994  tage  0.996*  0.063  
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qual_hd  1.000  0.956  t98  0.987***  0.001  
qual_phd  1.000  0.935  oth98  0.986***  0.001  
profqual  0.998  0.248  t04  0.990***  0.003  
pqtype_af  1.000  0.639  oth04  0.998  0.238  
pqtype_ag  1.000  0.940  pb_bf  1.000  0.900  
pqtype_bi  0.999  0.489  pb_b  1.000  0.826  
pqtype_et  0.999  0.350  pb_ft  1.000  0.931  
pqtype_l  0.999  0.379  pb_l  1.000  0.588  
pqtype_mba  0.998  0.236  pb_s  1.000  0.886  
chevaliers  0.996*  0.066  exnet  0.990***  0.003  
officiers  1.000  0.606  cbd  0.998  0.232  
commandeurs  1.000  0.978  pbody  1.000  0.960  
grand_off  0.993**  0.012  bassoc  1.000  0.841  
grand_croix  1.000  0.768  edbd  1.000  0.804  
corps_1  1.000  0.938  asbd  0.997  0.104  
corps_2  0.995**  0.041  con_no  0.994**  0.020  
corps_3  0.999  0.284  con_span  0.996*  0.052  
corps_4  0.994**  0.024  class_1  1.000  0.634  
corps_5  1.000  0.901  class_2  0.999  0.368  
type_pa_b  0.999  0.273  class_3  1.000  0.670  
type_p_b  0.999  0.303  h_gender  1.000  0.680  
EST  1.000  0.521  h_region  0.999  0.470  
FIN  0.999  0.418  age98  0.998  0.230  
GMT  1.000 
0.364*** 
0.547  h_afil  0.987***  0.001  
ALL  0.000           
  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
  
Reference categories: type_b, ACAD, pb_ac, class_4  
Table 4: Endogeneity: Auxiliary regressions  
Variable  Rsquared  Variable  Rsquared  
eliteschl  0.26†  corps_3  0.02  
elitehe  0.18  corps_4  0.13  
dis_ahss  0.09  corps_5  0.00  
dis_bea  0.03  type_pa_b  0.17  
dis_lop  0.06  type_p_b  0.04  
dis_sem  0.04  EST  0.08  
qual_fd  0.13  FIN  0.06  
qual_hd  0.11  GMT  0.06  
qual_phd  0.04  HRM  0.12  
profqual  0.03  LAW  0.05  
pqtype_af  0.03  M_M  0.06  
pqtype_ag  0.04  PAD  0.05  
pqtype_bi  0.17  pb_bf  0.11  
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pqtype_et  0.04  pb_b  0.06  
pqtype_l  0.06  pb_ft  0.39†  
pqtype_mba  0.03  pb_l  0.09  
chevaliers  0.04  pb_s  0.03  
officiers  0.09  exnet  0.11  
commandeurs  0.17  cbd  0.16  
grand_off  0.08  pbody  0.10  
grand_croix  0.37†  bassoc  0.07  
corps_1  0.10  edbd  0.05  
corps_2  0.05  asbd  0.11  
  
† Adjusted R-squared exceeds threshold of 25%.  
  
Table 5: Results of the static model (coefficients and significance tests)  
 
y1    0.11*  0.05*  0.02*      
y2  0.08*    0.02  0.02*      
y3  0.10*  0.04    0.00      
y4  0.20*  0.29*  0.00        
eliteschl  -0.02  0.08*  0.01  -0.01      
elitehe  0.07*  -0.01  0.00  0.00      
dis_ahss  0.07  0.07  0.03  -0.11*      
dis_bea  0.11  0.07  0.05  -0.04      
dis_lop  0.09  0.08  0.02  -0.04      
dis_sem  0.14  0.04  0.00  -0.05      
qual_fd  -0.12  0.03  -0.08  0.06      
qual_hd  -0.16  0.00  -0.06  0.04      
qual_phd  -0.15  0.02  -0.10  0.02      
profqual  0.05  -0.02  0.07  -0.04      
pqtype_af  0.01  -0.03  -0.05  0.05      
pqtype_ag  -0.12  0.00  -0.03  -0.03      
pqtype_bi  0.17  0.19  -0.15  0.02      
pqtype_et  -0.08  0.02  -0.06  0.05      
pqtype_l  0.01  -0.07  0.05  0.04      
pqtype_mba  0.02  0.05  -0.06  0.05      
chevaliers  0.02  0.03  -0.01  -0.01      
officiers  0.04  0.08  0.02  -0.02      
commandeur~1  -0.01  0.15*  0.07  -0.01      
grand_off  0.04  -0.02  0.09  -0.04      
corps_1  -0.31***  0.06  0.22**  0.02      
corps_2  0.03  0.01  0.14**  -0.02      
corps_3  -0.10  -0.10  0.23***  0.00      
corps_4  0.02  -0.12  0.19***  -0.02      
corps_5  -0.09  0.04  0.04  -0.01      
type_pa_b  -0.07  0.16*  -0.09*  0.01      
Variable   y1   y2   y3   y4   eliteschl   pb_ft   
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type_p_b  -0.27***  0.29*  -0.10  -0.30***      
EST  -0.03  0.14  -0.03  -0.73***      
FIN  -0.10  0.31**  -0.06  -0.74***      
GMT  0.02  0.16  -0.02  -0.74***      
HRM  -0.10  0.11  -0.05  -0.71***      
LAW  0.02  0.20  -0.13  -0.60***      
M_M  -0.07  0.13  -0.04  -0.72***      
PAD  -0.04  0.07  0.00  -0.74***      
pb_bf  0.04  0.51**  -0.05  0.36***      
pb_b  0.14  0.14  -0.08  0.37***      
pb_ft  0.04  0.19  0.03  0.41***      
pb_l  0.09  -0.41*  0.08  0.55***      
pb_s  -0.03  0.15  -0.05  0.37***      
cbd  0.05  0.02  0.25***  0.02      
pbody  0.12**  0.02  0.35***  0.01      
bassoc  0.09**  0.16***  0.38***  0.02*      
edbd  0.08  0.11*  0.30***  0.00      
asbd  0.02  0.10*  0.24***  0.00      
class_1  -0.03  -0.11  0.18***  -0.01  0.62***  0.55***  
class_2  -0.03  -0.06  0.11**  0.01  0.53***  0.08***  
class_3  -0.04  -0.10  0.07*  0.01  0.03  0.04**  
h_gender  0.08  -0.10  -0.03  0.04  0.28***  -0.07  
h_region  -0.04  0.03  0.02  -0.01  0.15***  -0.06***  
age98  -0.01***  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00***  
h_afil  0.09  -0.42***  -0.14**  0.02  -0.11  0.00  
Constant  0.15  0.14  0.12  0.28**  0.01  -0.16  
 
df   880            
Chi2   797.485            
P-value   0.979            
GFI   0.763            
AGFI   0.994            
RMSEA   0.000            
MC   1.046            
 
  
Note: The goodness-of-fit measures include the Chi-square test statistic (Chi2), the associated 
p-value, the general fit index (GFI), the adjusted general fit index (AGFI), the root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) and the McDonald’s centrality index (MC). The first 
four columns in Table 5 refer to the direct effects of explanatory variables on the pathways (x 
→ y and z → y). Column five and six show the impact of the variables of fate (z) on eliteschl 
and pb_ft (z → x). Hence, the indirect effect refers to (z → x → y). Direct and indirect effects 
are additive, as a chance in a variable of fate (z) affects pathways (y) directly (z → y) and 
indirectly (z → x → y).  
  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Goodness - of - fit me asures   
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework  
 
  
  
                    Partly endogenous  
Field of Power (FoP)  
Top - tier director  
( y 1 )  
  
Corporate  
networker (y 2 )  
  
Extra - corporate  
networker (y 3 )  
  
Entrepreneurship  
( y 4 )  
  
To enter the FoP: at least two out of four pathways must be f ollowed  
  
Professional  
qualification  
  
Career type  
  
Elite school  
  
Power base  
  
Social class  
  
Birthplace  
  
Age  
  
Family ownership  
  
 Figure 2: Dynamic model transition probabilities and partial impacts  
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Figure 3: Pathway frequencies by social class  
 
 n=217  n=462  n=346  n=57   
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Appendix: Definitions for variables  
Variable   Name  Type of variable  
1. Pathways to power  
y1  Top-tier executive (CEO or Executive 
Chairman)  
Dummy variable  
y2  Corporate networkers having at least two 
directorships of top 100 companies or one 
plus at least two other company 
directorships.  
Dummy variable  
y3  Membership of two or more extra-corporate 
boards  
Dummy variable  
y4  Company founder retaining ≥25% of equity   Dummy variable  
2. Variables of choice  
eliteschl  Elite school  Dummy variable  
elitehe  Elite higher education  Dummy variable  
dis_no, 
dis_ahss, 
dis_bea, 
dis_lop, 
dis_sem  
Discipline type in HE: arts, humanities, 
social sciences; business, economics, 
administration; law and other professions; 
science, engineering, mathematics  
Categorical (nominal 
variable)  
qual_no, 
qual_fd, 
qual_hd, 
qual_phd,  
Highest level in HE: none; first degree; 
higher degree; doctorate excluding honorary 
degrees  
Ordinal variable  
profqual  Recognized professional qualification: yes, 
no, or not known  
Dummy variable  
pqtype_af, 
pqtype_ag, 
pqtype_bi, 
pqtype_et, 
pqtype_l, 
pqtype_mba  
Professional qualification types: accounting, 
finance; agrégation; banking, insurance; 
engineering, technical; legal; master of 
business administration  
Categorical (nominal 
variable)  
chevaliers   
officiers   
commandeurs  
grand_off  
grand_croix  
Rank within honours system  Ordinal variable  
corps_1, 
corps_2, 
corps_3, 
corps_4, 
corps_5  
Grand corps membership: Conseil d’Etat  
(1); Corps des Mines (2);  Cour des  
Comptes (3); Inspection des Finances (4);  
Corps des Ponts et Chaussées (5)  
Categorical (nominal 
variable)  
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type_b, 
type_pa_b, 
type_p_b  
Career types: business; public  
administration into business; profession into 
business  
Categorical (nominal 
variable)  
 
ACAD  
ENT  
EST  
FIN  
GMT  
HRM  
LAW  
M_M  
OWN  
PAD  
Career platforms: academic; entrepreneur; 
engineering, scientific, technical; financial; 
general, operations management; personnel; 
law; media, sales, marketing; inherited 
ownership; public administration  
Categorical (nominal 
variable)  
tyear  Year first joined top 100 French company 
main board  
Continuous variable  
tage  Age first joined top 100 French company 
main board  
Continuous variable  
t98  Number of top 100 French company 
directorships in 1998  
Continuous variable  
oth98  Number of non-top 100 French company 
directorships in 1998  
Continuous variable  
t04  Number of top 100 French company 
directorships in 2004  
Continuous variable  
oth04  Number of non-top 100 French company 
directorships in 2004  
Continuous variable  
pb_ac, 
pb_bf, 
pb_b, 
pb_ft, 
pb_l, 
pb_s  
Power base: academia; banking, finance; 
business; family trust; law; state  
Categorical (nominal 
variable)  
exnet  Number of extra-corporate board or 
commission memberships  
Continuous variable  
cbd   Charity board  Dummy variable  
pbody  Membership of public body or significant 
political role  
Dummy variable  
bassoc  Board of business, trade or professional 
association  
Dummy variable  
edbd  Board of HE or research institution  Dummy variable  
asbd  Board of top sports or cultural organization  Dummy variable  
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con_no  Highest total number of corporate and extra-
corporate board memberships in 1998 or 
2004  
Continuous variable  
con_span  Number of life-worlds involved in at 
highest level from executive director, 
nonexecutive director, public or political 
body, business association, charitable 
foundation, education or research, arts or 
sports  
Continuous variable  
3. Variables of fate  
class_1 to 
class_4  
Social class  Four categories and 
thus split into three 
dummy variables  
h_gender  Gender  Dummy variable: 1 for 
males and 0 for females  
h_region  Birthplace  Dummy variable: 1 if 
born in Paris and 0 
otherwise  
age98  Age  Continuous variable in 
years  
h_afil  Nationality  Dummy variable: 1 for 
French nationals and 0 
for others  
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